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Abstract   This paper examines whether the Danish management system
achieves welfare maximisation. For cod in the North Sea, Skagerrak, and
Kattegat, rations are used. It is shown that rations raise substantial information
requirements and that the existing allocation of rations is inoptimal. In addition,
a linear programming model is used to show that there is considerable overca-
pacity in the Danish trawler fleet in the Baltic Sea. Danish fisheries managers
have access to an extensive data set, and with the available information it would
be possible to secure a welfare optimum.
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Introduction
The EU fisheries are regulated through a common fisheries policy. This policy was
agreed upon in 1982 and consists of a market policy, a structural policy, an external
policy, a control policy, and a conservation policy. In the market policy, a system of
market supports is established (Holden 1996), while the purpose of the structural
policy is to seek to coordinate development in fishing capacity and stock abundance
(Lynge-Jensen 2000). An important part of the structural policy is the Multi-Annual
Guidance Programmes (MAGP), which set objectives for development in fishing ca-
pacity. The purpose of the external policy is to negotiate fishing agreements with
third countries (Holden 1996), while the intentions of the control policy are to en-
sure compliance with the regulations (Lynge-Jensen 2000). An important aspect of
the control policy is that responsibility for control is placed at Member State level.
The conservation policy consists of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) policy and various
technical conservation measures such as gear restrictions, closed areas, etc.
(Karagiannakos 1995).
In the TAC policy, a total quota for each species is determined every year. These
quotas are then allocated to the Member States of the EU based on their historic
shares of the landings of each species (named relative stability). It is then up to the
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Member States to decide which fishermen are going to harvest the quota. In Den-
mark, rations or annual allocations are used to distribute the EU-determined quota to
fishermen. A ration is an individual, non-transferable quota on short time intervals,
while an annual allocation is a yearly, non-transferable quota.
However, the EU and the Danish fisheries policy face four main problems. First,
the fish stocks suffer from serious overexploitation (Anon. 2000). From an econom-
ics standpoint, this result is not surprising because it is the predicted outcome under
open access (Warming 1911) and regulated open access (Homans and Wilen 1997).
Second, the scientific recommendation is, roughly speaking, based on a single-spe-
cies assumption, while in reality the fisheries are multi-species. Therefore, the
economic recommendations about fisheries policy ought to depart from the eco-
nomic theory of joint production (Andersen 1979). Third, there is excess fishing
capacity, which is difficult to estimate empirically. Fourth, the fish stocks are shared
among several countries and, therefore, economic recommendations should depart
from game theory.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight to what extent the Danish management
system achieves welfare maximisation. In order to answer this question, attention is
restricted to a short-run analysis mainly because of the lack of understanding of fish
stock development (Anon. 2000). It is argued that a ration fishery raises substantial
information requirements and that the existing ration allocation is inoptimal. Fur-
thermore,  results  of  a  linear  programming  model  conclude  that  there  are
noncompliance incentives with the regulation and that substantial overcapacity ex-
ists. For simplicity, the paper focuses on fleet segments for which cod constitutes
the most important species in the catch composition.
In terms of fisheries management, Denmark is characterised by the availability
of comprehensive data information; e.g. data on trip-level vessel landings and infor-
mation about individual vessel costs (Anon. 1999). With this information it would,
by application of appropriate management measures, be possible to secure optimal
capacity and ration allocation. Because the necessary information is already col-
lected, there are no additional data collection costs associated with improved
application of this information with respect to welfare improvements.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the Danish man-
agement system, while the welfare properties of the ration fishery are discussed
after that. The issue of overcapacity in the Danish fishery is then highlighted, fol-
lowed by the conclusion.
Legal Rules for Fishing Cod in the North Sea
A set of legal rules forms a basis for the actions taken by fishermen. The legal basis
for exploitation of all stocks is rather complex. Therefore, the management of the
cod fishery has been selected, because cod is the most important species for human
consumption in Denmark.1 Cod is managed in four areas: the North Sea, Skagerrak,
Kattegat, and the Baltic Sea.
In the first three areas, a ration fishery is used as the management measure. A
ration can be defined as an allocation of a yearly quota over short time periods and
according to vessel length. The allocation of the yearly quota to fishermen is per-
1 Cod constituted between 22% and 28% of total landings value over the last five years (Anon. 1999).
Cod is targeted in mixed species fisheries in which gill netters and small demersal trawlers (below 50
GT) are the most important type of vessels, with cod constituting around 60% of the total landings value
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formed in three steps. First, the quota is distributed in intervals over the year taking
seasonal variations into account. In the North Sea and Skagerrak, the yearly quota is
distributed evenly over the year, while the first months receive a larger share of the
annual quota in Kattegat and the Baltic Sea. Second, the seasonal quota is allocated
to fishermen according vessel length.2 Third, an adjustment procedure is used to
change the initial allocation according to benchmarks which are the quotas fixed for
each time interval over the year and the catch of each vessel relative to the allocated
individual rations. There is no restriction on the number of vessels that may partici-
pate in the cod fishery.3
The ration periods vary from one week to two months, which makes it possible
for the manager to change the ration more or less frequently relative to development
in landings. With the aim of building further flexibility into the management system,
the ration in each sub-period may be exceeded up to 20%. The excess catch in one
ration period is then deducted from the next period’s ration. However, the ration of
the last period in a year cannot be exceeded, because transfers to the next year are
not allowed. Furthermore, transfers of quantities that have not been caught within
the relevant ration period are not possible.
The rations are calculated by the Fisheries Directorate based on the last year’s
average catch rates in the different vessel categories and adjusted for changes in the
quota of the current year relative to last year. In figure 1, vessel length is plotted
against the rations for the North Sea and Skagerrak. Medium-sized vessels receive a
larger share of the quota compared to other vessel sizes, which is determined by the
catch composition of the average vessel in each length group.
Because cod is relatively more important in the Baltic Sea compared to other
waters, the management system in the Baltic Sea is different from the management
system in the other areas. It is also more detailed with the flexibility to make fre-
quent adjustments in allocations based on each vessel’s performance. First, a license
is required for fishing cod. However, all vessels that apply are granted a license.
Once a license is granted, the vessel must not fish outside the Baltic Sea. With a li-
cense two choices exist: ration fishery and annual, individual non-transferable
quotas. The main difference between the two systems is the fishermen’s planning
period. While annual allocations make it certain how much could be caught and
when, rations may change over time.
Vessels that fished two years before the actual year in which annual allocations
are granted are allowed to catch the amount caught in the best of the two years plus
an additional 25%. However, the annual allocation for those vessels must not exceed
a predetermined allocation, which increases with vessel size and applies to all ves-
sels. If a vessel has caught at least 80% of its initial allocation before mid-June, it is
granted an additional amount. This is not automatic, the vessel owner has to apply
for the extra amount.
On the other hand, a reduction in the next year’s annual allocation will occur if
the vessel does not catch the allocated annual quantity. The vessel may also give no-
tice of exit from the fishery for one or several months. This is costly because the
annual allocation is then reduced by 10% per month. For June, July, and August,
which is the low season, notice of exit can only be given for all three months with a
10% reduction in the vessel’s total annual allocation. If the vessel has caught less
than 50% of the annual allocation by mid June, it is forced to return the difference
between the catch and 50% of the annual allocation. The same applies by mid-Octo-
ber, when the rate is 80%.
2 The allocation scheme is published in the law.
3 Remark that a license system is applied, and all that apply for a license receive it.Frost and Jensen 278
Associated with this management system is a  system of enforcement, control,
prosecution, and punishment. However, this is a slow, indirect system. The time lag
is long, and the whole procedure is resource intensive. The Fisheries Directorate is
responsible for monitoring noncompliance activities by the fishermen. According to
a catalogue developed by the Directorate, a decision is reached regarding which vio-
lations should be subject to administrative settlement and which should be subject to
public prosecution and  handed over to the police. The police have the power to in-
stitute prosecution and bring fishermen to trial.
The Danish management system makes heavy use of a penalty system to ensure
compliance with the regulations. This system is described in the Directorate’s cata-
logue, which is known by the fishermen although they may not know the penalty
rates by heart. A fine and confiscation of the value of the excess landings minus the
landing cost compose the total penalty to the fishermen.
The purpose of the next two sections is to provide an indication of whether or
not this rather detailed management system achieves welfare maximisation.
Short-run Analysis of Rations and Annual Allocations
A regulatory model from Clark (1990) is used to highlight whether the ration fishery
achieves welfare maximisation. Perfect information is assumed, and a ration fishery
with only two ration periods, 1 and 2, is considered for simplicity. Let y1i and y2i de-
note catches in period 1 and 2 for fisherman i, and E1i and E2i denote the effort in the
two periods for fisherman i. The fish stock is labelled x. The possibility of exceed-
ing the ration by 20% is ignored, and it is assumed that the accessibility of the fish
differs for the two periods because of seasonal variations. Call the accessibility co-
efficient for period 1 q1(x), and the accessibility coefficient for period 2 q2(x). The
cost functions are C1i(E1i) and C2i(E2i). Because y1i = q1(x)E1i, the ration restriction
corresponds to q1(x)E1i £ Q1i, where Q1i is the ration for period 1. It is also assumed
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that the fishermen ignore any resource conservation measures. Therefore, if p is the
price of fish, the maximisation problem for fisherman i may be written as:
Max pq1(x)E1i - c1i(E1i) + pq2(x)E2i - c2i(E2i) [ ] (1)
s.t.
q1(x)E1i £ Q1i (2)
q2(x)E21i £ Q2i. (3)
For periods 1 and 2, there are several possibilities depending on whether the ra-
tion restrictions are binding. Assume first that equations (2) and (3) are binding. In
this case, the first-order condition for period 1 is:




where l1i is a Lagrange multiplier for period 1 for fisherman i. Optimality requires
that l1i = l2i = l1j = l2j = m for all j ¹ i, where m is the social user cost of the fish
stock. In other words, the ration restriction shadow prices must be identical between
vessels and periods. The information requirements of this system are enormous, and
as currently managed, optimality in the ration fishery will not be reached. This point
is explained further in figure 2.
Assume next that the ration restriction is nonbinding. In this case, the first-order





This corresponds to the open-access condition, and under open-access it is well
known that l1i ® 0. Therefore, rations have no effect on instantaneous effort.
If the problem is slightly reformulated, it is possible to address a case of annual
allocations that is an alternative option to rations for the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Re-
call that the period 2 allocations are reduced when catches in period 1 are less than
80% of the annual allocation, Q1i. The restriction that applies in this case is:
q2(x)E2i £ q1(x)E1i if  q1(x) £ 0.8Q1i. (6)
Because of changes in the accessibility coefficients due to seasonal variations, q1(x)
and q2(x) can be different between periods. In the case where q1(x) ³ q2(x), equation
(6) is not binding. If q1(x) < q2(x), the restriction can be binding. With equation (6)
binding, the first-order condition is:




Equation (7) shows that fishermen face an opportunity cost for fishing less than 80%
of the annual allocation in period 1. This cost is the value of the loss of fishing op-Frost and Jensen 280
Figure 2.  Optimal Ration Allocation
portunity in period 2. To avoid this cost, fishermen could choose to harvest at least
80% of the annual allocation.
In defence of the annual allocation system, the 80% exists because the vessels
are heterogeneous, and the managers realise that they do not have perfect informa-
tion. If some vessels are not willing or able to catch at least 80% of the annual
allocation, it is taken from them and returned to the manager to avoid grey trade.
Furthermore, the 80% rule exists in order to provide the manager with correct infor-
mation with respect to improved reallocation. It should also be mentioned that
fishermen who have caught 80% of their allocation for the current year before mid-
June can apply for more.4 This makes the annual allocation system flexible.
In theory, the optimal allocation of rations secures that the marginal welfare is
equal between vessels and periods. The information requirements of this allocation
are rather comprehensive. With available account statistics, an approximation for the
true allocation to vessel categories can be:
Annual ration to segment 1  =
TR1 - VC1
TRi - VCi å
, (8)
where TR is total revenue and VC is variable costs.
In order to highlight the inefficiency of the existing allocation, such an alloca-
tion has been performed for cod. The results are summarised in figure 2. The
calculations are based on the assumptions that the vessels are homogeneous within
the vessel categories and that they can fish in all waters. In practise, these assump-
tions are not fulfilled. Note also that the rations in figure 2 apply to all vessels.
Comparing figures 1 and 2, it is clear that the large vessels ought to receive a larger
share of the quota. However, with cost information at the vessel level, it would be
4 The rate and date may vary from year to year.Welfare Optimality and Extensive Data Information 281
possible to estimate an individual cost function. Therefore, an optimal allocation of
rations, where the marginal profit is equal between vessels and time periods, can be
ensured.
It is important to note that the Danish control policy can be interpreted as a tax
system because the penalties are known ex ante.5 The problem with implementing a
tax system is that not only is it necessary to tie the tax to a subject (in fisheries, the
landings of a species), but it is also necessary to determine who is to be charged. For
example, when issuing traffic fines for speeding, it is not sufficient to know just the
license plate. The identity of the driver must also be established. This point can be
seen from the following court trial for two pairs of trawlers that have exceeded their
individual quota allocation. The case is complicated by the realistic legal circum-
stance that one of the vessels was fishing with two different skippers — one of them
being the owner. The case is shown in table 1. Both vessels recorded the excess
landings correctly in the logbook.
The skipper explained to the court that it was his expectation that the allocation
(individual quota) could be increased towards the end of the year, or alternatively,
that the excess volume would be deducted from the next year’s allocation. That may
explain the correct recording in the logbooks. However, the court emphasised that
the vessel did not have, at the time of violation, the necessary individual quota. The
total penalty relative to the total revenue is 26.6% if the owner of vessel #2 also
pays for a hired skipper. If the fine (item 1) is put relative to the profit after crew
remuneration and depreciation, but before interest, the fine is about 15% of the
profit. The profit relative to the gross revenue for this vessel category is about 22%
(Anon. 1999). It should be noted that the fine would have been three times higher if
the excess landings had not been recorded in the logbooks.
It is also worth noting that the fine is calculated from the gross revenue less landing
costs, but before crew wages. This implies that the confiscation of excess landings is a
burden for the owner if he cannot make the crew return their salaries. On the other hand,
the penalty signals that the crew is also responsible for the violation, which is entailed
by the crew share system applied in the Danish fishery. This makes the Danish enforce-
ment system a tax system that is designed to ensure compliance with the quota.
5 Harford (1984) also interprets a penalty as a tax.
Table 1
Results from Studying a Penalty Case, Euro and kg
Vessel #1 Vessel #2
Skipper Skipper #1 Skipper #2 Total
1. Licence allocation (kg) 672,000
2. License allocation (Euro) 297,349 297,349 594,698
3. Landings (kg) 930,112
4. Landings (Euro) 411,559 411,559 823,119
5. Excess landings (kg) 129,056 33,752 95,304 823,119
6. Excess landings (Euro) 114,210 29,869 84,341 258,112
7. Landings costs (Euro) 228,421
8. Net revenue (Euro) 99,363 99,363 29,695
9. Fine 10% (Euro) 9,933 2,859 7,034 198,726
10.Total penalty (Euro) 109,292 102,218 19,826
11.Item 10/Item 4 (%) 26.6 24.8Frost and Jensen 282
In the next section, the incentive for noncompliance is highlighted. From the
point of view of welfare economics, it is shown that the quotas and capacity do not
match each other and that there is excess capacity in the Danish fishery.
Incentives for Noncompliance
In systems where constraints are imposed, hidden values are created (Dantzig 1963).
Those shadow prices reflect that the fishery is not allowed to reach an equilibrium where
marginal revenue is equal to marginal costs. If a fishery is managed by limiting the num-
ber of fishing days to a lower level than where revenues equal costs of a marginal day, a
shadow value showing the contribution to profit of a marginal day is generated.
The fishery considered for further analysis is the Baltic Sea trawl fishery. The
model contains three trawler segments (A, B, C) and five species groups. These spe-
cies groups include all important species found in the Baltic Sea. Apart from
trawlers that include both demersal and pelagic gear, the fishery is carried out by
gill netters that catch about 25% of the cod by volume but only about 7% of the total
landings from the Baltic Sea. Gill netters are not included because the catch per day
information required for the analysis is more uncertain relative to that for trawlers.
The catch composition of the fleet segments is made up of these species in different
compositions. The average crew, including the skipper, is two in segment A, three in
segment B, and four in segment C. The model maximises the remuneration to the
crew including the skipper/owner and the net profit. This is chosen because a collec-
tive decision between skipper and crew is assumed if noncompliance with
restrictions is going to be accomplished successfully.
The economic characteristics of the three fleet segments are displayed in table
2. Revenue and costs are shown for the average vessel, and costs are distributed (de-
pendent) on the number of fishing days (C(NOFD)), landings in volume (C(LAND)),
landings in value (C(VLAND)), and fixed costs. Costs are extracted annually from
the cost and earnings statistics and recalculated to unit costs (per fishing day, per kg
landed, and per unit value landed). Crew wages are dependent on revenue from the
landings, and the percentage share is calculated based on the annual figures.
The objective of the fisherman is to maximise the profit of his own vessel and
crew, therefore, share the interest of the skipper/owner. The profit function for a
vessel in fleet segment k is:6
Maxpk = (ptikqtikNOFDtk -cdk
ti
å NOFDtk -cvkptikqtikNOFDtk - clkqtikNOFDtk -cfk), (9)
where:
NOFD is the number of fishing days per time period (t) and vessel segment (k);
NOFD is the choice variable and is considered a proxy for effort;
p is the price for species i;
qtik is the catch per day in quarter t of species i in vessel segment k;
cdk is the cost per day at sea for fleet segment k;
cvk is the landing value cost for fleet segment k;
clk is the landing volume cost for fleet segment k;
cfk is the fixed cost per vessel for fleet segment k.
6 A similar model is used in Frost and Andersen (2001).Welfare Optimality and Extensive Data Information 283
The manager’s objective is to maximise rent for the entire fishing ground. The ob-
jective function, therefore, includes the number of vessels, V.7 There are no effects
of fish stock change in the objective function:
Max P = (ptikqtikNOFDtk - cdk
tik å NOFDtk  (10)
- cvkptikqtikNOFDtk - clkqtikNOFDtk - cfk)Vk.
The short-time allocated rations and annual individual non-transferable allocations
are recorded in the database of the Fisheries Directorate for each vessel, and ideally
they ought to be applied in the model. To use that amount of data would require sub-
stantial computer and software capacity. Therefore, the individual vessel allocations
are, for our purposes, substituted with a limited number of fishing days which is suf-
ficient to demonstrate the fundamental issues of the analysis, such as shadow prices
and effort reallocation. In the fishery under examination, limitation of the rations
becomes binding before the maximum number of fishing days. Therefore, the maxi-
mum number of fishing days limit is reduced to reflect the ration limitations for
each fleet segment.
In a system where the number of fishing days is restricted, the constraints differ
for the fisherman and the manager. The fisherman faces a limited number of fishing
days per time period, while the manager faces a quota restriction. In this model,
which is a short-run model, the time period is quarterly and the restriction of the
fisherman can be expressed as:
NOFDtk £ Gtk, (11)
where G can be defined as the physical maximum number of days available to the
vessel. Restrictions imposed by the manager are designed to control the amount of
capital:
Table 2
Economic Characteristics of Danish Trawlers Fishing in the Baltic Sea
Fleet Segments
A (12–14 m) B (14–24 m) C (> 24 m)
Euro
Revenue 168,501 431,335 637,762
C(NOFD) 21,879 58,773 79,737
C(LAND) 988 4,964 6,203
C(VLAND) 17,149 40,906 64,789
C(WAGES) 76,149 197,726 289,627
Fixed Costs 19,172 67,599 179,553
Profit 109,312 259,093 307,480
7 The number of vessels is used as a proxy for capacity, which multiplied by the number of fishing days
approximates fishing effort.Frost and Jensen 284
Vk £ Uk, (12)
where U is the maximum number of vessels in a segment. Furthermore, contribution
to the margin in the short run and the profit in the long run has to be larger than
zero. Otherwise, the fisherman will exit. This implies that:
p,P ³ 0. (13)
The restriction of the manager is that the quotas must not be exceeded. This restric-




where Q is the quota restriction for each species.
The incentives for noncompliance are calculated by using an optimization
model (linear programming) applied to catch, costs, and earnings data for the Baltic
Sea in 1997. The selected fleet is the trawler fleet that is dominant in the Baltic Sea.
Because the model is linear in days at sea, the fishermen will push days at sea to the
physical limit, given the limitations of other inputs, which are assumed that the
manager can control. The number of fishing days is limited to 55 for fleet segment A
and 60 for fleet segment B in all quarters. Vessels in fleet segment C do not fish in
the Baltic Sea between May and October. Therefore, the number of fishing days is
fixed at a low level in the second quarter and set to zero in the third quarter for fleet
segment C. The landings of cod and fish for reduction constitute the highest part of
the total landings for fleet segment A, while the highest part of the total landings is re-
duction and herring in fleet segment C. However, there is considerable variation in the
landing of species between quarters. The total landings have to be within the agreed
upon quotas. For cod, fish for reduction, and herring the quotas are totally used,
while the quotas are not used for plaice and other species. With respect to landings
per day (productivity) measured in cod, fleet segment B has the highest productivity
each year. Therefore, this fleet segment could claim the highest number of fishing
days. There is also considerable variation in the productivity between quarters and
fleet segments in these quarters. Some results of the model are shown in table 3.
From table 3 it is seen that the optimal number of vessels should be 16, 192, and
5, respectively. The number of vessels shown in this table is not the actual number
of vessels that were fishing in 1997 but the number that, given conditions in 1997,
was the optimal composition with respect to maximising profit for the entire fishery.
This number is calculated by use of a non-linear programming model. The model
produces a series of shadow prices of an extra fishing day from the point of view of
the fisherman and society, respectively. These shadow prices are also included in
table 3. The solution for the fishermen is limited by the number of fishing days that
is fixed by the manager for each vessel in each fleet segment. If, for example, a type
C vessel could employ one more day in the second quarter, he would add Euro 2.79
thousands. If the same vessels employ one extra fishing day in the third quarter, no
contribution would be obtained because this vessel type would either not catch any-
thing or the opportunity costs would be too high. Assuming profit maximising
behaviour, it is obvious that the fisherman would try to expand his fishery. There-
fore, noncompliance behaviour is a natural consequence of the results shown in
table 3. A further implication of the shadow prices calculated for the fishermen is
that they show considerable overcapacity in the fishery. This can be concluded be-
cause the shadow prices are positive.Welfare Optimality and Extensive Data Information 285
If the problem is considered from the manager’s point of view, the results are
different because of the quota restriction. The remuneration to labour from an extra
fishing day differs from that of the fisherman because, given the restrictions, the
marginal vessel in any segment would only lead to a reduction in other segments.
The manager would have no incentive to increase the number of vessels. Table 3 il-
lustrates that fleet segment B in the fourth quarter yields Euro 127.2 thousands
subject to the quota restriction. This is Euro 0.66 thousands per vessel, while the in-
dividual vessel owner thinks he would contribute Euro 1.23 thousands. The analysis
above shows that with available information, it is possible to calculate optimal ca-
pacity (optimal number of vessels). With optimal capacity, the shadow price on
fishing days for the manager would be zero. Thus, welfare improvements could be
ensured with available information.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether the Danish management system achieves welfare
maximisation. In Denmark, rations and/or annual allocations are used as a manage-
ment system. Based on a model from Clark (1990), it is shown that ration fishery
raises substantial information requirements. Furthermore, it is shown that the exist-
ing allocation of rations is inoptimal. For cod in the Baltic Sea, fishermen can
choose between annual allocations and rations. For annual allocations, a rule is that
next year’s allocation is reduced if this year’s harvest is less than 80% of the annual
Table 3
Optimal Number of Vessels and Shadow Prices
for Fishing Days for Fishermen and Managers
Fishermen Society
A 16
Optimal Number B 191




1. Quarter A 1,011 1,115
1. Quarter B 1,555 -6,384
1. Quarter C 2,459 3,785
2. Quarter A 563 1,164
2. Quarter B 1,502 18,414
2. Quarter C 2,793 9,015
3. Quarter A 340 543
3. Quarter B 1,141 70,268
3. Quarter C 0 0
4. Quarter A 417 2,807
4. Quarter B 1,232 127,186
4. Quarter C 3,858 7,426Frost and Jensen 286
allocation. It is also shown that the 80% rule creates an opportunity cost. This cost
is the value of lost fishing opportunity in the next year.
The paper also includes a small linear/non-linear programming model in order
to highlight the excess capacity issue in the Danish fleet. In the model, the fisher-
man maximises the profit plus the remuneration to crew, while the manager
maximises the welfare of the whole fleet. The fisherman and the manager face dif-
ferent restrictions. The fisherman is restricted by the number of fishing days, while
the quotas restrict the manager. The results of the programming model are that there
are considerable incentives to noncompliance with the regulations, because there is
a positive shadow price of the fishing day restriction. The implication of this is that
there is overcapacity in the Danish fleet.
Danish fisheries management is characterised by the availability of extensive
data; i.e., the Danish managers have information about the landings at the trip level
and costs at the vessel level. With available information it would be possible to dis-
tribute rations to ensure a welfare optimum, where marginal revenue is equal to
marginal costs. In the long-run, capacity reduction could be sustained by use of de-
commissioning programmes, assuming that capital is nonmalleable. Restricted entry
(license) is already implemented in the EU fisheries. The conclusion is, therefore,
that with the available information, welfare improvements are possible, but the in-
formation must be better utilised if the aim is to maximize welfare. This constitutes
an important area for future research.
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